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Economic Calculation and the 
Limits of Organization 
Peter G. Klein 
Economists have become increasingly frustrated with the text- book model of the firm. The "firm" of intermediate microeco- nomics is a production function, a mysterious "black box" 
whose insides are off-limits to respectable economic theory (relegated 
instead to the lesser disciplines of management, organization theory, 
industrial psychology, and the like). Though useful in certain contexts, 
the textbook model has proven unable to account for a variety of real- 
world business practices: vertical and lateral integration, geographic and 
product-line diversification, franchising, long-term commercial contract- 
ing, transfer pricing, research joint ventures, and many others. As an al- 
ternative to viewing the firm as a production function, economists are 
turning to a new body ofliterature that views the firm as anorganization, 
itself worthy of economic analysis. This emerging literature is the best- 
developed part of what has come to be called the "new institutional eco- 
nomics."' The new perspective has deeply enhanced and enriched our un- 
derstanding of firms and other organizations, such that we can no longer 
agree with Ronald Coase's 1988 statement that "[wlhy firms exist, what 
determines the number of firms, what determines what firms do . . . are 
not questions of interest to most economists" (Coase 1988a, p. 5).The new 
theory is not without its critics; Richard Nelson (1991), for example, ob- 
jects that the new institutional economics tends to downplay discretion- 
ary differences among firms. Still, the new institutional economics-in 
particular, agency theory and transaction cost economics-has been 
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the subject of increasing attention in industrial organization, corpo- 
rate finance, strategic management, and business history.2 
This paper highlights some distinctive Austrian contributions to 
the theory of the firm, contributions that have been largely neglected, 
both inside and outside the Austrian literature. In particular, I ar- 
gue that  Mises's concept of economic calculation-the means by 
which entrepreneurs adjust the structure of production to accord with 
consumer wants-belongs a t  the forefront of Austrian research into 
the nature and design of organizations. There is a unique Austrian 
perspective on economic planning, a perspective developed over the 
course of the socialist calculation debate. As was recognized in the 
early Austrian reinterpretations of the calculation debate (Lavoie 
1985, Kirzner 1988), Mises's conception of the problem faced by so- 
cialist planners is part and parcel of his understanding of how re- 
sources are allocated in a market system. Mises himself emphasized 
that  planning is ubiquitous: "[Elvery human action means planning. 
What those calling themselves planners advocate is not the substitu- 
tion of planned action for letting things go. I t  is the substitution of the 
planner's own plan for the plans ofhis fellow men" (Mises 1947, p. 493). 
All organizations plan, and all organizations, public and private, per- 
form economic calculation. In this sense, the calculation problem is 
much more general than has usually been realized. 
With their unique perspective on markets and the difficulties of 
resource allocation under central planning, third-and fourth-genera- 
tion Austrian economists have always implicitly understood the eco- 
nomics of organization. In this context, as Nicolai Juul Foss (1994, p. 
32) notes in a recent issue of this Review, "it is something of a doctrinal 
puzzle that  the Austrians have never formulated a theory of the firm." 
Foss points out that  many elements of the modern theory of the 
firm-property rights, relationship-specific assets, asymmetric infor- 
mation, the principal-agent problem-appeared, a t  least in elemen- 
tary form, in Austrian writings since the middle stages of the calcula- 
tion debate. Indeed, Rothbard's treatment of firm size in Man, Econ- 
omy, and State (1962) was among the first discussions to adopt explic- 
itly the framework proposed by Ronald Coase in 1937, a framework 
that  underlies most contemporary theorizing about the firm. Mises's 
discussion in Human Action (1949) of the role of financial markets 
foreshadows Henry Manne's seminal 1965 article on the market for 
corporate control along with the recent recognition of finance as an  
essential part of economics. 
%he framework of transaction cost economics has already made it into textbook 
form: Kreps (1990, pp. 744-go), Rubin (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Baye and 
Beil(1994), and Acs and Gerlowski (1996). 
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Besides anticipating parts of the modern literature, Mises and 
Rothbard also introduced significant innovations, though this has not yet 
been generally recognized. Their contributions, while not part of a fully 
articulated, explicit theory of the firm, deserve attention and develop- 
ment, especially by those working on such issues from within the Aus- 
trian Scho01.~ These contributions are Rothbard's application of the 
calculation problem to the limits of the firm, and Mises's discussion of 
how the financial markets both limit managerial discretion and perform 
the ultimate resource allocation task in a market economy. 
The Textbook Theory of the Firm 
In neoclassical economic theory, the firm as such does not exist a t  all. 
The "firm" is a production function or production possibilities set, a 
means of transforming inputs into outputs. Given the available technol- 
ogy, a vector of input prices, and a demand schedule, the firm maximizes 
money profits subject to the constraint that its production plans must be 
technologically feasible. That is all there is to it. The firm is modeled as 
a single actor, facing a series of relatively uncomplicated decisions: what 
level of output to produce, how much of each factor to hire, and so on. 
These "decisions," of course, are not really decisions a t  all; they are trivial 
mathematical calculations, implicit in the underlying data. In the long 
run, the firm may also choose an optimal size and output mix, but even 
these are determined by the characteristics of the production function 
(economies of scale, scope, and sequence). In short: the firm is a set of 
cost curves, and the "theory of the firm" is a calculus problem. 
To be sure, these models are not advertised as  realistic descrip- 
tions of actual business firms; their use is purely instrumental. As David 
Kreps (1990,p. 233bhimself much less sanguine about the merits ofthe 
traditional model than most-puts it: if real-world firms do not maximize 
profits as the traditional theory holds, "that doesn't mean that profit maxi- 
mization isn't a good positive model. Only the data can speak to that, and 
then only after we see the implications of profit maximization for observ- 
able behavior." However, even granting instrumentalism its somewhat du- 
bious r n e r i t ~ , ~  the  production-function approach is unsatisfactory, be- 
cause i t  isn't useful for understanding a variety of economic phenom- 
ena. The black-box model is really a theory about aplant or production 
process, not about a firm. A single firm can own and operate multiple 
3~ have in mind recent work by Boudreaux and Holcombe (1989), Foss (1993a, 
1993b, 1993c), Langlois (1988, 1992a, 1992b), and Minkler (1993a, 1993b). 
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economicsn-the source of most economists' views on method-see Boland (1979), 
Caldwell (1980), and Musgrave (1981); all reprinted in Caldwell(1984) along with De 
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production processes. Similarly, two or more firms can contract to op- 
erate jointly a single production process (as in a research joint ven- 
ture). If we want to understand the scale and scope of the firm as a 
legal entity, then, we must look beyond the textbook model. 
Coase and Transaction Costs 
Ronald Coase, in his celebrated 1937 paper on "The Nature of the 
Firm," was the first to explain that  the boundaries of the organization 
depend not only on the productive technology, but on the costs of trans- 
acting business. In  the Coasian framework, a s  developed and ex- 
panded by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996), Klein, Crawford, and Al- 
chian (1978), and Grossman and Hart (19861, the decision to organize 
transactions within the firm as  opposed to on the open market-the 
"make or buy decisionn-depends on the relative costs of internal ver- 
sus external exchange. The market mechanism entails certain costs: 
discovering the relevant prices, negotiating and enforcing contracts, 
and so on. Within the firm, the entrepreneur may be able to reduce 
these "transaction costsn by coordinating these activities himself. 
However, internal organization brings another kind of transaction 
cost, namely problems of information flows, incentives, monitoring, 
and performance evaluation. The boundary of the firm, then, is deter- 
mined by the tradeoff, a t  the margin, between the relative transaction 
costs of external and internal exchange. In this sense, firm boundaries 
depend not only on technology, but on organizational considerations; 
that  is, on the costs and benefits of contracting. 
The relative costs of external and internal exchange depend on 
particular characteristics of transaction: the degree to which relation- 
ship-specific assets are involved, the amount of uncertainty about the 
future and about trading partners'actions, the complexity of the trad- 
ing arrangement, and the frequency with which the transaction occurs. 
Each matters in determining the preferred institutional arrangement (that 
is, internal versus external production), although the first-"asset speci-
ficity"-is held to be particularly important.5 Williamson (1985, p. 55) 
defines asset specificity as "durable investments that are undertaken in 
support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which invest- 
ments are much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users 
should the original transaction be prematurely terminated." This could 
describe a variety of relationship-specific investments, including both 
specialized physical and human capital, along with intangibles such 
as R&D and firm-specific knowledge or capabilities. 
'indeed, Williamson's transaction cost economics is sometimes described as the "govern- 
ance" or asset-specificity branch of the New Institutional Economics, as opposed to the 
"measurementn or team production branch (associated with Alchian and Demsetz 1972). 
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The recent transformation of economists' thinking about the firm 
has been nicely summarized by Mark Roe (1994, p. vii): 
Economic theory once treated the firm as a collection of machinery, 
technology, inventory, workers, and capital. Dump these inputs into 
a black box, stir them up, and one got outputs of products and profits. 
Today, theory sees the firm as more, as a management structure. The 
firm succeeds if managers can successfully coordinate the firm's 
activities; it fails if managers cannot effectively coordinate and match 
people and inputs to current technologies and markets. At the very 
top of the firm are the relationships among the firm's shareholders, 
its directors, and its senior managers. If those relationships are 
dysfunctional, the firm is more likely to stumble." 
With this new orientation, economic theory is playing an increasingly 
visible role in finance, accounting, management, and other areas once 
thought to be beyond the purview of economics. 
Economic Calculation and the Limits to Firm Size 
Unfortunately, the growing economics literature on the theory of the firm 
focuses mostly on the costs of market exchange, and much less on the 
costs of governing internal exchange. The new research has yet to pro- 
duce a fully satisfactory explanation of the limits to firm size (Williamson 
1985, chap. 6).In Coase's words, "Why does the entrepreneur not organize 
one less transaction or one more?" Or, more generally, "Why is not all pro- 
duction carried on in one big firm?" (Coase 1937, pp. 4243). The theory of 
the limits to the firm is perhaps the most difficult and least well developed 
part of the new economics of organization. Existing contractual explana- 
tions rely on problems of authority and responsibility (Arrow 1974); incen- 
tive distortions caused by residual ownership rights (Grossman and Hart 
1986; Holmstrom and Tirole 1989); and the costs of attempting to reproduce 
market governance features within the firm (Williamson 1985, chap. 6) .I t  
is here that Austrian theory has an  obvious contribution to make, by ap- 
plying Mises's theorem on the impossibility of economic calculation under 
socialism. Rothbard has shown how the need for monetary calculation in 
terms of actual prices not only explains the failures of central planning 
under socialism, but places an upper bound on firm size. 
The Socialist Calculation Debate: A Brief Review 
To understand Mises's position in the calculation debate, one must 
realize that his argument is not exclusively, or even primarily, about 
'~ustr ians would add that capital, land, and labor-"managementn included-are 
not the only inputs or factors of production. There is also entrepreneurship or uncer- 
tainty bearing, and what Rothbard (1962, pp. 538-41) calls ownership or the "decision- 
making factor." On this see also Mises (1949, pp. 291-52, and pp. 66-68) below. 
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socialism. I t  is about the role of prices for capital goods. Entrepreneurs 
make decisions about resource allocation based on their expectations 
about future prices, and the information contained in present prices. 
To make profits, they need information about all prices, not only the 
prices of consumer goods but the prices of factors of production. With- 
out markets for capital goods, these goods can have no prices, and 
hence entrepreneurs cannot make judgments about the relative scar- 
cities of these factors. In  short,  resources cannot be allocated effi- 
ciently. In any environment, then-socialist or not-where a factor of 
production has no market price, a potential user of that  factor will be 
unable to  make rational decisions about i t s  use. Stated this  way, 
Mises's claim is simply tha t  efficient resource allocation in  a market 
economy requires well-functioning asset markets. Because scholars 
differ about what Mises "really meant," however, i t  may be useful here 
to provide a brief review of the debate. 
Before 1920, according to the standard account,' socialist theorists 
paid little attention to how a socialist economy would work in practice, 
most heeding Marx's admonition to avoid such "utopian" speculation. 
Then Mises, known a t  the time mainly a s  a monetary theorist, pub- 
lished the sensational article later translated a s  "Economic Calcula- 
tion in the  Socialist Commonwealth" (19201.~ Mises claimed tha t  with- 
out private ownership of the means of production, there would be no 
market prices for capital goods, and therefore no way for decisionmak- 
ers to evaluate the relative efficiency of various production techniques. 
Anticipating the later argument for "market socialism," Mises argued 
tha t  even if there were markets for consumer goods, a central planner 
could not "impute" meaningful prices to capital goods used to produce 
them. In short, without market-generated prices for both capital and 
consumer goods, even the most dedicated planner would find i t  "im- 
possible" to allocate resources according to consumer wants. 
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s Mises's argument became 
the focus of intense discussion within the German-language litera- 
ture. Eventually i t  was agreed tha t  Mises was correct a t  least to point 
out t ha t  a socialist society could not do without such things as  money 
and prices, a s  some early socialists had suggested, and tha t  there was 
no feasible way to set prices according, say, to quantities of labor time. 
Nonetheless, it was felt tha t  Vilfredo Pareto and his follower Enrico 
Barone (1908) had shown tha t  nothing was "theoretically" wrong with 
7 ~ o rexamples of the "standard accountn of the calculation debate see Schumpeter 
(1942, pp. 172-86) and Bergson (1948). My discussion of the "revisionist view" follows 
Hoff ( l949) ,  Salerno (1990), and Rothbard (1991). 
8Other works that made arguments similar to that of Mises include N. G. Pierson's 
"The Problem of Value in the Socialist Communityn (1902) and parts of Max Weber's 
Economy and Society (1921). 
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socialism, because the requisite number of demand and supply equa- 
tions to make the system "determinate" would exist under either capi- 
talism or socialism. If the planners could somehow get the necessary 
information on preferences and technology, they could in principle 
compute an equilibrium allocation of final goods. 
The most important response to Mises, however, and the one al- 
most universally accepted by economists, was what became known as 
"market socialism" or the "mathematical solution," developed by Fred 
Taylor (1929), H. D. Dickinson (1933), Abba Lerner (1934), and Oskar 
Lange (1936-37). In a system of market socialism, capital goods are 
collective property, but individuals are free to own and exchange final 
goods and services. The system would work like this. First, the Central 
Planning Board chooses arbitrary prices for consumer and capital 
goods. At those prices, the managers of the various state-owned enter- 
prises are instructed to produce up to the point where the marginal 
cost of each final good is equal to its price, and then to choose the input 
mix that minimizes the average cost of producing that quantity. Then, 
consumer goods prices are allowed to fluctuate, and the Central Planning 
Board adjusts the prices of capital goods as shortages and surpluses of 
the final goods develop. Resources would thus be allocated according to 
supply and demand, through a process of "trial-and-error" essentially 
the same as that practiced by the managers of capitalist firms. Lange's 
contribution, it has generally been held, was to show that production un- 
der market socialism could be just as efficient as production under capi- 
talism, since the socialist planners "would receive exactly the same in- 
formation from a socialized economic system as did entrepreneurs un- 
der a market systemn (Heilbroner 1970, p. 88h9 
Market socialism was seen as an answer not only to Mises's calculation 
problem, but also to the issue of "practicality" raised by Hayek and Lionel 
Robbins. Hayek, in his contributions to Collectivist Economic Planning 
(Hayek, ed., 1935a1, later expanded in "The Competitive Solution"(1940) 
and his well-known papers "Economics and Knowledge" (1937) and "The 
Use of Knowledge in Society" (1945), and Robbins, in his The Great De- 
pression (1934), had changed the terms of the debate by focusing not on 
the problem of calculation, but on the problem of knowledge. For Hayek 
and Robbins, the failure of socialist organization is due to a mechanism 
design problem, in that planners cannot allocate resources efficiently be- 
cause they cannot obtain complete information on consumer preferences 
and resource availability. Furthermore, even if the planners were 
'1t would no doubt be gratuitous to point out that since the collapse of central planning 
in Eastern Europe the writer of that comment has changed his mind, writing that although 
'[flifty years ago, it was felt that Lange had decisively won the argument for socialist 
planning," now '[ilt turns out, of course, that Mises was rightn (Heilbroner 1990, p. 92). 
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somehow able to acquire these data, it would take years to compute the 
millions of prices used by a modern economy. The Lange-Lerner-Taylor 
approach claimed to solve this preference-revelation problem by trial- 
and-error, so no actual computations would be neces~ary '~  
With the widespread acceptance of the theory of market socialism, 
there developed an "orthodox line" on the socialist calculation debate, 
neatly summarized in Abram Bergson's well-known survey of "Social- 
ist Economics" (1948) and in Joseph Schumpeter's Capitalism, Social- 
ism and Democracy (1942, pp. 172-86). According to this line, Mises 
first raised the problem of the possibility of economic calculation under 
socialism, only to be refuted by Pareto and Barone; Hayek and Robbins 
then "retreated" to the position that  socialist planners could calculate 
in theory, but that  in practice the information problem would make 
this too difficult; then the market socialists showed that  trial and error 
would eliminate the need for complete information on the part of the 
planners. Therefore, the argument goes, economic theory per se can 
say nothing conclusive about the viability of central planning, and the 
choice between capitalism and socialism must be purely political. 
Calculation versus Incentives 
The orthodox line on socialist planning has been modified in recent 
years with the development of incentive and information theory. The 
differences between capitalism and socialism, it is now typically held, 
lie in the different incentive properties of the two systems. Centrally 
directed systems are thought to be subject to greater agency 
costs-managerial discretion, shirking, and so on-than market sys- 
tems (see, for example, Winiecki 1990). After all, Lange himself 
warned that  "the real danger of socialism is that of  a bureaucratization 
of economic life" (Lange 1936-37, p. 109; italics in original). 
As has  been pointed out elsewhere (Rothbard 1991, pp. 51-52), 
however, the calculation debate was not primarily about agency or 
managerial incentives. The incentive problem had long been known" 
1°~ange actually claimed years later that even market socialism would be made obsolete 
with the advent of high-speed computers, which could instantly solve the huge system of 
simultaneous equations for the central planner. "Were I to rewrite my [I9361 essay today my 
task would be much simpler. My answer to Hayek and Robbins would be: So what's the 
trouble? Let us put the simultaneous equations on an electronic computer and we shall obtain 
the solution in less than a second. The market process with its cumbersome thtonnements 
appears old fashioned. Indeed, it may be considered as a computingdevice of the pre-electronic 
agen (Lange 1965, pp. 401-2). Obviously, Lange did not have much experience with a 
computer. Also, during his time as  chairman of the Polish Economic Council in the 1950s, 
Lange never tried to put market socialism into practice (see Lange 1958). 
"we tend to forget just how old the idea of socialism is, that it is not a twentieth- 
century invention; the subtitle ofAlexander Gray's famous book The Socialist Dadition 
(1946) is "Moses to Lenin." 
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(if not fully developed) and was expressed in the famous question: "Un- 
der socialism, who will take out the garbage?" That is, if everyone is com- 
pensated "according to his needs," what will be the incentive to do the 
dirty and unpleasant tasks; or, for that matter, any tasks a t  all? The tra- 
ditional socialist answer was that self-interest is aproduct of capitalism, 
and that socialism would bring about a change in human nature. In the 
worker's paradise would emerge a 'mew Socialist Man," eager to serve 
and motivated only by the needs ofhis fellows. These early theorists seem 
to have assumed, to borrow the expression used by Oliver Williamson 
(1991, p. 18) in a critique of a more recent socialist proposal, "the abo- 
lition of opportunism by agencies of the state." Experience has exposed 
the charming naivete of such notions. 
But Mises's challenge to socialism is distinct from this well-known 
incentive problem.'2 Assume for the moment that everyone is willing to 
work just as hard under central direction as under a market system. 
There still remains the problem of exactly what directives the Central 
Planning Board will issue. The Board will have to decide what goods and 
services should be produced, how much of each to produce, what interme- 
diate goods are needed to produce each final good, and so on. In a complex, 
modern economy with multiple stages of production, resource allocation 
requires the existence ofmoney prices for capital goods, prices that under 
capitalism arise from an ongoing process of competitive bidding by entre- 
preneurs for the factors of production. This process cannot be replicated 
by input-output analysis, computer simulations, or any other form of ar- 
tificial market. Mises's main point was that socialism fails because deci- 
sion makers require meaningful prices for all of these factors to choose 
from the vast array of possible factor combinations. "Without recourse to 
calculating and comparing the benefits and costs of production using the 
structure of monetary prices determined a t  each moment on the market, 
the human mind is only capable of surveying, evaluating, and directing 
production processes whose scope is drastically reduced to the compass 
of the primitive household economy" (Salerno 1990, p. 52). 
The distinction between calculation and incentives is important 
because the modern economics literature on organizational de- 
sign-from transaction cost explanations of firm size, to public choice 
theories of bureaucracy, to recent work on market socialism and the "soft 
budget constraint" (Kornai 1986kfocuses primarily on incentive prob- 
lems (possibly encouraged by Lange's famous warning about bureaucracy). 
Incentive theory asks how, within a specified relationship, a principal 
can get an agent to do what he wants him to do. Mises's problem, however, 
1 2 ~ i s e sdoes devote a section of the 1920 paper to 'Responsibility and Initiative in 
Communal Concerns," but he clearly considers this a secondary problem for socialist 
planners, not the primary one. 
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was different: How does the principal know what to tell the agent to do? 
That is, just what activities ought to be undertaken? What investments 
should be made? Which product lines expanded and which ones con- 
tracted? The ideas developed in the calculation debate suggest that when 
organizations are large enough to conduct activities that are exclusively 
internal-so that no reference to the outside market is available-they 
will face a calculation problem as well as an incentive problem. 
In this sense, market-socialist proposals are mostly irrelevant to the 
real problems of socialist organization. This is the case Mises himself 
sought to make in his critique of market socialism in Human Action (Mises 
1949, pp. 694-711). There he complained that the market socialists-and, 
for that matter, all general equilibrium theorists-misconceive the nature 
of "the economic problem." Lange, Lerner, and Taylor looked primarily at 
the problem of consumer goods pricing, while the crucial problem facing a 
modern economy concerns the capital structure: namely, in what way 
should capital be allocated to various activities? The market economy, 
Mises argued, is driven not by "management"-the performance of speci- 
fied tasks, within a framework given to the manager-but by en- 
trepreneurship, meaning the speculation, arbitrage, and other risk-bear- 
ing activities that determine just what the managerial tasks are. I t  is not 
managers but entrepreneurs, acting in the capital and money markets, 
who establish and dissolve corporations, create and destroy product lines, 
and so on. These are precisely the activities that even market socialism 
seeks to abolish. In other words, to the extent that incentives are impor- 
tant, what socialism cannot preserve is high-powered incentives not in 
management, but in entrepreneurial forecasting and decisionmaking. 
Mises has been described as saying that  i t  is unreasonable to ex- 
pect managers of socialist enterprises to "play market," to act as if they 
were managers of private firms where their own direct interests were a t  
stake. This may be true, but Mises's prime concern was that entrepreneurs 
cannot be asked to "play speculation and investment" (Mises 1949, p. 705). 
The relevant incentive problem, he maintains, is not that of the subordinate 
manager (the agent), who takes the problem to be solved as given, but that 
of the speculator and investor (the principal), who decides just what is the 
problem to be solved. Lange, Lerner, and Taylor see the market through a 
strictly static, neoclassical lens, where all the parameters of the system are 
given and only a computational problem needs tobe solved. In fact the mar- 
ket economy is a dynamic, creative, evolving process, in which entrepre- 
neurs-using economic calculation-make industries grow and shrink, 
cause new and different production methods to be tried and others with- 
drawn, and constantly change the range of available products. It is these 
features of market capitalism, and not the incentives of agents to work 
hard, that are lost without private property ownership. 
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Indeed, traditional command-style economies, such a s  tha t  of the 
former U.S.S.R., appear to be able only to mimic those tasks that  mar- 
ket economies have performed before; they are  unable to set  up  and 
execute original tasks. 
The [Soviet] system has been particularly effective when the central 
priorities involve catching up, for then the problems of knowing what 
to do, when and how to do it, and whether it was properly done, are 
solved by reference to a working model, by exploiting what Ger- 
schenkron . . . called the "advantage of backwardness.". . .Accompa-
nying these advantages are shortcomings, inherent in the nature of 
the system. When the system pursues a few priority objectives, 
regardless of sacrifices or losses in lower priority areas, those ulti- 
mately responsible cannot know whether the success was worth 
achieving. The central authorities lack the information and physical 
capability to monitor all important costs-in particular opportunity 
costs-yet they are the only ones, given the logic of the system, with 
a true interest in knowing such costs. (Ericson 1991, p. 21) 
Without economic calculation, there is no way to figure out if tasks 
have been performed efficiently. Hence without markets for physical 
and financial capital-which determine what  tasks will be performed 
and whether they have been performed adequately-an economic sys- 
tem has difficulty generating anything new, and must  rely on outside 
references to tell i t  what to do. Of course, the  only reason the Soviet 
Union and the communist nations of Eastern Europe could exist a t  all 
is tha t  they never fully succeeded in establishing socialism worldwide, 
so they could use world market prices to establish implicit prices for 
the goods they bought and sold internally (Rothbard 1991,pp. 73-74). 
In Mises's words, these economies 
were not isolated social systems. They were operating in an environ- 
ment in which the price system still worked. They could resort to 
economic calculation on the ground of the prices established abroad. 
Without the aid of these prices their actions would have been aimless 
and planless. Only because they were able to refer to these foreign 
prices were they able to calculate, to keep books, and to prepare their 
much talked about plans. (Mises 1949, pp. 698-99) 
As we will see below, the firm is in the same situation: i t  needs outside 
market prices to plan and evaluate its actions. 
Rothbard and the Limits of Organization 
Rothbard's main contribution to the theory of the firm was to generalize 
Mises's analysis of the problem of resource allocation under socialism to 
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the context of vertical integration and the size of the organization. 
Rothbard writes in Man, Economy, and State that up to a point, the 
size of the firm is determined by costs, as in the textbook model. But 
"the ultimate limits are set on the relative size of the firm by the neces- 
sity for markets to exist in every factor, in order to make it possible for 
the firm to calculate its profits and losses" (Rothbard 1962, p. 536). This 
argument hinges on the notion of "implicit costs." The market value of 
opportunity costs for factor services-what Rothbard calls "estimates 
of implicit incomes"-can be determined only if there are external 
markets for those factors (pp. 542-44). For example, if an  entrepre- 
neur hires himself to manage his business, the opportunity cost of his 
labor must be included in the firm's costs. But without an actual mar- 
ket for the entrepreneur's managerial services, he will be unable to 
figure out his opportunity cost; his balance sheets will therefore be less 
accurate than they would if he could measure his opportunity cost. 
The same problem affects a firm owning multiple stages of produc- 
tion. A large, integrated firm is typically organized as groups of semi- 
autonomous business units or "profit centers," each unit or division spe- 
cializing in a particular final or intermediate product. The central man- 
agement of the firm uses the implicit incomes of the business units, as 
reflected in statements of divisional profit and loss, to allocate physical 
and financial capital across the divisions. More profitable divisions are 
expanded, while less profitable divisions are scaled back. Suppose the 
firm has an  upstream division selling an intermediate component to a 
downstream division. To compute the divisional profits and losses, the 
firm needs an economically meaningful "transfer price" for the compo- 
nent. If there is an external market for the component, the firm can use 
that market price as the transfer price.'3 Without a market price, how- 
ever, a transfer price must be estimated in another way. 
In practice, this is typically done on a cost-plus basis; sometimes, the 
buying and selling divisions are leR free to bargain over the price (Eccles 
and White 1988; Shelanski 1993; King 1994). At the very least, any arti- 
ficial or substitute transfer prices will contain less information than ac- 
tual market prices; Rothbard (1962, p. 547) puts it more strongly, calling 
a substitute price "only an arbitrary symbol." In either case, firms relying 
13~othbard (1962, pp. 900-1, n. 56) notes that the implicit transfer price may be 
somewhat more or less than the existing market price, since the entry of either the buying 
or the selling division into the external market may bid the price up or down slightly. 
Unlike Hirshleifer (1956), then, Rothbard does not require the external market to be 
perfectly competitive for a market-based transfer price to be economically meaningful. For 
Rothbard, "thinn markets are adequate: all that is necessary to have a genuine "external 
marketn is the existence of at least one other producer (seller) of the intermediate good. 
Of course, if external prices are perfectly competitive, then the economy must be 
in a competitive general equilibrium, in which information is perfect and all contracts 
are complete, and in which there is thus no need for firms. 
15 Klein: Economic Calculation a n d  the Limits of Organization 
on these prices will suffer. "Not being able to calculate a price, the firm 
could not rationally allocate factors and resources from one stage [or 
division] to another" (p. 547). The use of internally traded intermedi- 
ate goods for which no external market reference is available intro- 
duces distortions that reduce organizational efficiency. This gives us 
the element missing from contemporary theories of economic organi- 
zation, an upper bound: the firm is constrained by the need for exter- 
nal markets for all internally traded goods. In  other words, no firm can 
become so large that i t  is both the unique producer and user of a n  in- 
termediate product; for then no market-based transfer prices will be 
available, and the firm will be unable to calculate divisional profit and 
loss and therefore unable to allocate resources correctly between divi- 
sions. As Rothbard puts it: 
Since the free market always tends to establish the most efficient and 
profitable type of production (whether for type of good, method of 
production, allocation of factors, or size of firm),we must conclude that 
complete vertical integration for a capital-good product can never be 
established on the free market (above the primitive level). For every 
capital good, there must be a definite market in which firms buy and sell 
that good. I t  is obvious that this economic law sets a definite maximum 
to the relative size ofany particular firm on the free market. . . . Economic 
calculation becomes ever more important a s  the market economy devel- 
ops and progresses, as the stages and the complexities of type and 
variety of capital goods increase. Ever more important for the mainte- 
nance of an  advanced economy, then, is the preservation of markets for 
all the capital and other producers'goods. (pp. 547-48; italics in original) 
Like the centrally planned economy, the firm needs market signals to 
guide its actions; without them the firm cannot survive. Note that in gen- 
eral, Rothbard is making a claim only about the upper bound of the firm, 
not the incremental cost of expanding the firm's activities (as long as ex- 
ternal market references are available). As soon as the firm expands to 
the point where a t  least one external market has~disappeared, however, 
the calculation problem exists. The difficulties become worse as more and 
more external markets disappear, as "islands of noncalculable chaos 
swell to the proportions of masses and continents. As the area of incalcu- 
lability increases, the degrees of irrationality, misallocation, loss, impov- 
erishment, etc., become greater" (p. 548). In other words, the firm is lim- 
ited by the extent to which markets exist for the goods it allocates inter- 
nally. Without market prices for these goods, the firm must rely on rela- 
tively costly and inefficient methods of generating its own accounting 
prices, to perform internal calculations.14 
14~h i sdoes not mean that because external prices are necessary for large firms to 
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Significantly, i t  is at this point in the discussion in Man, Economy, 
and  State (p. 548) that  Rothbard launches into a discussion ofthe socialist 
calculation debate, making i t  obvious that  the two issues are inextricably 
linked. The reason that  a socialist economy cannot calculate is not that  
i t  is socialist, but because a single agent owns and directs all resources. 
Expanding on this point in his 1976 essay on "Ludwig von Mises and Eco- 
nomic Calculation Under Socialism," Rothbard explains: 
There is one vital but neglected area where the Mises analysis of 
economic calculation needs to be expanded. For in a profound sense, the 
theory is not about socialism at all! Instead, it applies to any situation 
where one group has acquired control of the means of production over a 
large area-or, in a strict sense, throughout the world. On this particular 
aspect of socialism, it doesn't matter whether this unitary control has 
come about through the coercive expropriation brought about by social- 
ism or by voluntary processes on the free market. For what the Mises 
theory focuses on is not simply the numerous inefficiencies of the political 
as compared to the profit-making market process, but the fact that a 
market for capital goods has disappeared. This means that, just as 
Socialist central planning could not calculate economically, no One Big 
Firm could own or control the entire economy. The Mises analysis applies to 
any situation where amarket for capital goods has disappearedin a complex 
industrial economy, whether because of socialism or because of a giant 
merger into One Big Firm or One Big Cartel. (Rothbard 1976, p. 75) 
The Mises analysis thus applies t o  any situation where the market for 
a particular capital good disappears because a firm has  become so 
large that  i t  is the unique producer and user of tha t  capital good. As 
we have seen, such a firm will not be viable. 
I t  is surprising that  Rothbard's extension of Mises's argument has 
received virtually no attention in the Austrian literature, even though 
the point appears four times in Man, Economy, and  State (p. 536, p. 543, 
pp. 547-48, and p. 585) and again in the  1976 essay.15 The argument 
function efficiently, firms will necessarily become larger where external markets are 'thick" 
or betterdeveloped. On the contrary, large firms typically arise precisely where external 
markets a r e  poorly developed or hampered by government intervention; these a r e  the 
kinds ofcircumstances tha t  give entrepreneurs an  advantage in coordinating activities 
internally. However, such firms a re  still constrained by the need forsome external market 
reference. 
15~avoiebriefly notes the  Rothbard analysis in his Rivalry a nd  Central Planning 
(1985, p. 62n). Fritz Machlup, in a comment on Rothbard's 1976 essay, says he is "intrigued" 
by the analogy between the central planner's problem and the firm's problem, calling i t  "an 
issue I have tried to sell in several ofmy publications. . . but unfortunately not with sufficient 
successn(Machlup1976, p. 114). He cites an  early book (Machlup 1934, esp. pp. 209-14) and 
a later article (Machlup 1974, esp. pp. 4 2 4 5  and 52-54), both published in German, on the 
problem of "artificial" transfer prices. The argument is also foreshadowed by Hayek in 
Prices and  Production (1935b, p. 63) in a discussion on vertical integration. 
Klein: Economic Calculation and the Limits of Organization 
needs further development and elaboration, which should prove a use- 
ful exercise because the contemporary literature on the size of the firm 
lacks an adequate explanation for the limits to organization. The Roth- 
bard analysis also suggests a line of research in business strategy: all else 
equal, firms able to use market-based transfer prices should outperform, 
in the long run, firms using administered or negotiated transfer prices.16 
As of yet, there is little empirical work on this topic, despite the possible 
emergence of an "Austrian school of strategy" (Jacobson 1992). A related 
issue that has received considerable attention, however, is the diffculty of 
allocating overhead or fixed cost across divisions. If an input is essentially 
indivisible (or nonexcludable), then there is no way to compute the oppor- 
tunity cost of just the portion of the input used by a particular division 
(see Rogerson 1992, for a discussion ofthese problems).17 Firms with high 
overhead costs should thus be a t  a disadvantage relative to firms able to 
allocate costs more precisely between business units. Indeed, in the lit- 
erature on cost accounting there has been some recent interest in "market 
simulation accounting" (Staubus 1986), by which firms try to assess the 
price at which an  asset would trade in an  active market, based on ob- 
served market prices and related information. The Rothbardian position 
on the limits to firm size suggests that the market simulation approach 
may prove a useful accounting technique. 
By the time of the 1976 paper, Rothbard had adopted an  explicitly 
Coasian framework in his discussion of the limits to firm size. His own 
treatment, Rothbard says, 
serves to extend the notable analysis of Professor Coase on the 
market determinants of the size of the firm, or the relative extent of 
corporate planning within the firm as against the use of exchange 
and the price mechanism. Coase pointed out that there are diminish- 
ing benefits and increasing costs to each of these two alternatives, 
resulting, as he put it, in an "'optimum' amount of planning" in the 
free market system. Our thesis adds that the costs of internal corpo- 
rate planning become prohibitive as soon as markets for capital goods 
begin to disappear, so that the free-market optimum will always stop 
well short not only of One Big Firm throughout the world market but 
also of any disappearance of specific markets and hence of economic 
calculation in that product or resource. (Rothbard 1976, p. 76) 
'"his line of reasoning has interesting implications for the study of innovation. 
Since the innovating firm is more likely to be using unique intermediate goods, 
innovation carries with its benefits the cost of more severe internal distortions. Eco- 
nomic calculation is then another obstacle the innovator must overcome. 
1 7 ~ i s e s(1944, p. 32) recognized the problem of allocating overhead costs, mention- 
ing this as a possible exception to the notion that divisional accounting costs can reflect 
"true" costs. 
I 
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This is noteworthy because even a s  late a s  1972, Coase was describing 
his 1937 paper as "much cited and little used" (Coase 1972, p. 62). Al- 
chian and Demsetz's "Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization" came out only in 1972, and Williamson's Markets and 
Hierarchies in 1975. Rothbard was thus among the earliest writers to 
develop and extend the Coasian perspective. 
Managerial Discretion and the Financial ~arke t s"  
As mentioned above, much current research in the theory of the  firm 
focuses on the agency problem. Under what conditions can managers 
exercise discretionary behavior? What kinds of rules, or mechanisms, 
can be designed to align the manager's interest with the owner's? With- 
out effective rules, what actions will managers choose? An early applica- 
tion was the alleged "separation of ownership and control" in the modern 
corporation. Berle and Means (1932) argued that the modern firm is run 
not by its owners, the shareholders, but by salaried managers, whose in- 
terests are different from those of shareholders and include executive 
perks, prestige, and similar rewards. If the corporation is diffusely held, 
no individual shareholder has  sufficient motivation to engage in 
(costly) monitoring of managerial decisions, and therefore discretion 
will flourish a t  the expense of the  market value of the firm. 
Henry Manne's essay, "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Con- 
trol" (1965), responded tha t  managerial discretion will be limited a s  
long as there i s  a n  active market  for control of corporations. When 
managers engage in discretionary behavior, the share price of the  firm 
falls, and this invites takeover and subsequent replacement of incum- 
bent management. Hence while managers may hold considerable 
autonomy over the  day-to-day operations of the firm, the stock market 
places strict limits on their behavior.Ig To be sure, there is a large and 
divergent literature on the effectiveness of the takeover mechanism in 
providing managerial discipline (see Romano 1992 for a summary). If 
managers desire acquisitions to increase their own prestige or span of 
control-to engage in "empire buildingv-then an  unregulated market 
will generate "too many takeovers." Other critics point out t ha t  if the 
difference between the current (undervalued) price of the firm and its 
after-takeover market  value is common knowledge, then the  target 
firm's shareholders will refuse to tender their shares until the current 
'"his section is based on Klein (1994, pp. 397-98). 
L 9
There are  other mechanisms to limit managers'discretionary activities, such a s  
the market for managers itself; on this see Fama (1980). Williamson (1975) argues tha t  
the  capital market,  a s  an  outside control device, tends to be less effective than a n  
internal device, such a s  the  adoption of the  "M-form" structure. Fama's article, along 
with Manne's and several other important papers on this topic, is  collected in Putter- 
man, ed. ( 1986). 
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price is bid up, appropriating a share of the returns to the acquiring 
firm's shareholders. Under those conditions, the market will generate 
"too few" takeover^.'^ 
The central insight of Manne's paper is also found in Mises's Human 
Action (1949), in the passage distinguishing what Mises calls "profit man- 
agement9'from "bureaucratic management" (pp. 308-11). It is true, Mises 
acknowledges, that the salaried managers of a corporation hold consid- 
erable autonomy over the day-to-day operations of the firm. Nonetheless, 
the shareholders make the ultimate decisions about allocating re- 
sources to the firm, in their decisions to buy and sell stock: 
[The Berle-Means] doctrine disregards entirely the role that the 
capital and money market, the stock and bond exchange, which a 
pertinent idiom simply calls the "market," plays in the direction of 
corporate business. . . . [Tlhe changes in the prices of common and 
preferred stock and of corporate bonds are the means applied by the 
capitalists for the supreme control of the flow of capital. The price 
structure as determined by the speculations on the capital and money 
markets and on the big commodity exchanges not only decides how 
much capital is available for the conduct of each corporation's busi- 
ness; it creates a state of affairs to which the managers must adjust 
their operations in detail. (p. 303) 
Mises does not identify the takeover mechanism per se as a means for 
capitalists to exercise control-takeovers were much less popular be- 
fore the late 1950s, when the tender offer began to replace the proxy con- 
test as the acquisition method of choice-but the main point is clear: The 
true basis of the market system is not the product market, the labor mar- 
ket, or the managerial market, but the capital market, where en- 
trepreneurial judgments are exercised and decisions carried ouL2' 
2 0 ~ h eflaw in the latter argument is that shareholders will not in general have the 
same information as  incumbent managers, outside 'raiders," and other specialists. It  
is not in the small shareholder's interest to learn these details; that is why he delegates 
such responsibilities to managers in the first place. The raider who discovers a 
difference between a firm's current market value and its potential value under new 
management has an opportunity for an entrepreneurial profit (less the transaction costs 
of takeover). Because shareholders have delegated these responsibilities, they will not 
in general earn a share of this profit. As Rothbard (1962, p. 372) observes, however, 
since shareholders (owners) choose to delegate operational responsibility to manag- 
ers-contracting out, if you will, for the managerial function-they themselves retain 
the ultimate rights of corporate control. 
21~ompareRothbard (1962, p. 538):Wired managers may successfully direct production 
or choose production processes. But the ultimate responsibility and control of production 
rests inevitably with the owner, with the businessman whose property the product is until 
it is sold. It  is the owners who make the decision concerning how much capital to invest 
and in what particular processes. And particularly, it is the owners who must choose the 
managers. The ultimate decisions concerning the use of their property and the choice of 
the men to manage it must therefore be made by the owners and by no one else." 
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As discussed above, Mises's treatment of the importance of finan- 
cial markets is also the key to his final rebuttal in Human Action to 
Lange, Lerner, and the other market-socialist critics of his calculation 
argument (Mises 1949, pp. 694-711). The market socialists, he argued, 
fail to understand that  the main task performed by a market system 
is not the pricing of consumer goods, but the allocation of capital 
among various branches of industry. By focusing on production and 
pricing decisions within a given structure of capital, the socialists ig- 
nore the vital role of capital markets. Rothbard (1993) notes that the 
same criticism can be applied to the textbook, production-function 
model of the firm, where capital is also taken for granted. "Neoclassi- 
cal microtheory talks about 'managers' producing up to the point where 
MR=MC, without ever talking about who or what is allocating capital to 
them. In short, neoclassical firms are implicitly assumed to have a fmed 
amount of capital allocated to them. . . and they can only use that capital 
to invest in their own firm and nowhere else. Hence, the nonsensical con- 
clusion that each firm's manager will try to squeeze out the last cent of 
profit, pushing production until MR=MC." Fortunately, the new litera- 
ture on transaction-cost determinants of contractual relations has be- 
gun to bring capital back into the received microtheory. 
Finally, on the subject of the Berle-Means doctrine, Mises notes in 
Human Action that "the emergence of an omnipotent managerial class is 
not a phenomenon of the unhampered market economy," but a result of 
government policy (Mises 1949, p. 307). Here he expands upon his earlier 
analysis in Bureaucracy (194.4, where he attacks the claim that bureauc- 
racy follows naturally Erom firmsize. Mises conceives of bureaucracy as rule- 
following, as opposed to profit-seeking, behavior. He reserves the term "bu- 
reaucratic management" for the governing of activities that have no cash 
value on the market. As long as a firm's inputs and outputs are bought and 
sold, the central management of the fm will have the information pro- 
vided by market prices to evaluate the efficiency of the various branches 
and divisions within the firm. Then subordinate managers can be given 
wide discretion to make daily operational decisions.22 If an organization 
produces a good or service that has no market price-the output of a 
government agency, for example-then subordinate managers must be 
given specific instructions for how to perform their tasks. 
'khapter 1 ofBureaucracy, on profit management and the sources of entrepreneurial 
profit, contains a remarkably lucid account of economic calculation under caoitalism and 
its impossibility under socialism. T o  the entrepreneur of capitalist socieiy a factor of 
production through its price sends out a warning: Don't touch me, I am earmarked for 
another, more urgent need. But under socialism these factors of production are mute" 
(Mises 1944, p. 29). 
Mises also provides a very Coase-like discussion of the make-or-buy decision, 
though without citation (p. 33). 
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The fact that managers in a private firm have latitude to make day- 
to-day decisions, Mises argues, does not make the firm "bureaucratic." 
"[Nlo profit-seeking enterprise, no matter how large, is liable to become 
bureaucratic provided the hands of its management are not tied by gov- 
ernment interference. The trend toward bureaucratic rigidity is not in- 
herent in the evolution of business. It is an  outcome of government 
meddling with business" (Mises 1944, p. 12).By this Mises means that  
government interference impedes the entrepreneur's use of economic 
calculation and the attempt to use prices to impose managerial disci- 
pline. Mises gives three examples (pp. 64-73): taxes and price regula- 
tions that interfere with corporate profits (distorting an important sig- 
nal of managerial performance); laws that  interfere with hiring and 
promotion (including the need to hire public relations staffs and legal 
and accounting personnel to comply with government reporting re- 
quirements); and the omnipresent threat of arbitrary antitrust or 
regulatory activity, in response to which entrepreneurs must become 
adept at "diplomacy and bribery" (p. 72). 
Mark Roe (1994) develops a similar argument in his recent work 
on the politics of corporate finance. The phenomenon he calls "strong 
managers, weak ownersn is not an outgrowth of the market process; it 
is the result of legal restrictions on firm ownership and control. In the 
U.S., for example, banks and other institutions are forbidden from 
owning firms; antitrust laws prohibit industrial combinations like the 
Japanese keiretsu; and anti-takeover restrictions dilute the discipli- 
nary effects of the takeover mechanism. Laws that  require diffuse 
ownership create what Roe terms the "Berle-Means corporation," in 
which "fragmented ownership shifts power in the firm to managers" 
(p. 93hZ3 Absent such legal restrictions, Mises would argue, manage- 
rial autonomy is no inefficiency; it's an essential tool for operating a 
large, decentralized organization. But the firm must have accurate di- 
visional accounting statements to evaluate managerial performance, 
and for this it  needs the information contained in market prices. 
Alternative Austr ian  Approaches: Knight, Uncertainty, 
a n d  "Market-Based Management" 
Recently, some Austrian economists have suggested that  the Coasian 
framework may be too narrow, too squarely in the general-equilibrium 
tradition to deal adequately with Austrian concerns (Boudreaux and 
Holcombe 1989; Langlois 1994a). They contend that the contemporary 
theory of the firm, following Coase, retains the perspective of static equi- 
librium analysis and profit maximization over a fixed set of outcomes 
230n the relationship between corporate governance and economic performance, 
see also Gilson (1995). 
22 The Review of Austrian Economics Vol. 9, No. 2 
with known probabilities. As an alternative, some writers propose the 
framework in Frank Knight's Risk,Uncertainty, and Profit (1921). The 
Knightian framework, they argue, offers genuine uncertainty, dise- 
quilibrium and process analysis, and thus a scope for real en-
trepreneurship - aspects purportedly more congenial to Austrians. 
"The Coasian and Knightian theories of the firm deal with the issue 
[of the existence of firms] from two different vantage points. The 
Coasian theory takes the inputs and outputs in the firm's production 
process as  given, and models the firm as an organization that acts to 
minimize the costs of transforming these inputs into outputs. . . . How-
ever, in Knight's model, entrepreneurship is the primary role of the firmn 
(Boudreaw and Holcombe 1989, p. 152). Williamson's transaction cost 
economics, as characterized by Langlois (1994a, p. 175), does broaden the 
notion of cost minimization to include transaction costs as well as produc- 
tion costs, but i t  remains essentially a static exercise with a limited role 
for expectations: "Seldom does the theory give thought to the possibility 
that organizational forms may be influenced as much by environments 
that  exist only as future possibilities, imagined or feared." 
These descriptions, however, paint with too broad a brush; as Foss 
(1993~)has recently pointed out, there are "two Coasian traditions." 
One tradition, the nexus-of-contracts branch associated with Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972), studies the design of ex ante mechanisms to limit 
shirking when supervision is costly. Here the emphasis is on monitor- 
ing and incentives in an (exogenously determined) moral-hazard rela- 
tionship. The aforementioned criticisms may apply to this branch of 
the modern literature, but they do not apply to the other tradition, the 
governance or asset-specificity branch, especially in Williamson's more 
heterodox formulation. Williamson's transaction cost frameworkincorpo- 
rates non-maximizing behavior (bounded rationality); true, "structural" 
uncertainty or genuine surprise (complete contracts are held not to be 
feasible, meaning that all expost contingencies cannot be contracted upon 
ex ante); and process or adaptation over time (trading relationships de- 
velop over time, typically undergoing a "fundamental transformation" 
that changes the terms of trade). In short, "at least some modern theories 
of the firm do not a t  all presuppose the 'closed' economic universe-with 
all relevant inputs and outputs being given, human action conceptual- 
ized as maximization, etc.-that [some critics] claim are underneath 
the contemporary theory of the firm" (Foss 1993a, p. 274). Stated dif- 
ferently, one can adopt an  essentially Coasian perspective without 
abandoning the Knightian or Austrian view of the entrepreneur as an  
uncertainty-bearing, innovating decision maker.24 
2 4 ~ o rdo all Coasian perspectives deny the importance of specialized knowledge 
or routines in determining a firm's capabilities or "core competence." Transaction cost 
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Similarly, the approach described in this paper differs from that  
advanced in the recent literature on "market-based management" 
(Ellig 1993; Ellig and Gable 1993). Market-based management is the 
philosophy that firm success depends critically on the ability to repli- 
cate market-like features within the organization. One of these is "in- 
ternal markets" for intermediate goods (and services such as financial, 
legal, accounting, and R&D support) along with the establishment of 
strict profit-center divisions. Like market prices, these internal prices 
convey information about local circumstances. Other features include an 
explicit "mission" or recognition of the firm's core competence, clearly de- 
fined roles and responsibilities for lower-level employees (analogous to 
property rights in a market economy), employee rewards based on per- 
formance (a profit-and-loss system), a well-defined "corporate culture" 
(customs, behavioral norms), and decentralized decision making. 
Underlying market-based management is the team-production or 
nexus-of-contracts model of the firm advanced by Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972), supplemented with the "capabilities" theory of Edith Penrose 
(1959),G. B. Richardson (1972), and David Teece (1980,1982). This is not 
the appropriate place for an extended discussion of the capabilities view; 
suffice it to say that this literature has both its defenders and its detrac- 
t o r ~ . ' ~The relevant point here is that the literature on market-based man- 
agement, like other writings in the nexus-of-contracts tradition, mischarac- 
terizes the nature of "planning" within the firm.For example, it attributes to 
the Coase-Williamson tradition the view that "internal markets are doomed 
to failure, because the business fkm is by nature a command hierarchy" (Ellig 
1993, p. 9). The Coasian tradition, however, does not imply that firms do or 
should adopt a command-andcontrol structure; on the contrary, as we have 
already seen, the modern firm will tend to be significantly decentralized, so 
that managers and workers at all levels of operations can make use of local 
knowledge. All decisions are not made from above, by executive fiat; the 
"M-form" corporation described by Williamson and Chandler is a blend of 
market and hierarchy, of centralization and decentralization. 
In other words, the entrepreneur does make some decisions by "fiat"; 
the firm is definitely a "taxis," rather than a "cosmos" (to use Hayek's eso- 
teric terminology). This does not imply, however, that all decisions must be 
made from the top; we can agree with the market-based management 
literature that "neither central planning nor command-and-control are 
economics, for example, simply holds that the need for expos t  governance of contracts 
in the presence of relationship-specific investments, and not "tacit knowledge" per se, 
is the most useful way to think about the boundaries of the firm. For the case that 
Austrian economics is more compatible with the capabilities literature (for substantive, 
not only methodological, reasons), see Minkler (1993b) and Langlois (1944a). 
' r
"For critical surveys see Conner (1991) and Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1992). 
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the defining characteristics of a business firm" (p. 11).Indeed, given 
competition in the product and factor markets, firms will always tend to 
select the optimum amount of "market-liken features. The firm's problem, 
then, is not too much "conscious" planning; the crucial issue is whether 
these plans are made, and tested, from within a larger market setting. 
The entrepreneur's plans can be carried out, as we saw above, only when 
there are definite markets for all internally traded goods or activities. 
What firms need is not necessarily internal markets, but the informa- 
tion generated by market prices. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper has been to highlight some Austrian contri- 
butions to the theory of the firm and to suggest directions for future 
research along the same lines. In  particular, Rothbard's argument 
about the need for markets in intermediate goods, and how that  places 
limits on the scale and scope of the organization, deserves further de- 
velopment. This may be a more fruitful exercise than some work in the 
alternative Austrian traditions. 
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